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Abstract: On May 9, 2010 euro zone countries announced the creation of the European 
Financial Stability Facility as a response to the sovereign debt crisis. This paper investigates the 
impact of this announcement on bank share prices, bank CDS spreads and sovereign CDS 
spreads. The main private beneficiaries were bank creditors, especially of banks heavily exposed 
to southern Europe and Ireland. Furthermore, countries with banking systems heavily exposed to 
southern Europe and Ireland benefited, as evidenced by lower sovereign CDS spreads. The 
combined gains of bank debt holders and shareholders exceed the increase in the value of their 
banks’ sovereign debt exposures, suggesting that banks saw their contingent claim on the 
financial safety net increase in value. 
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1 Introduction+
On Sunday May 9 2010, euro zone politicians, the ECB and the IMF laid out a new 
strategy to deal with the European sovereign debt crisis. Foremost, the euro zone countries 
announced the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) which was to provide 
loans to euro zone countries experiencing refinancing problems. The EFSF would have 
€440 billion at its disposal, with its own debt guaranteed by the set of euro zone countries.  At 
the same time, the IMF and the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism were to make 
€250 billion and €60 billion available, respectively, for external support to euro zone countries, 
bringing the total amount earmarked for such support to €750 billion. Simultaneously, the ECB 
stated that it was willing to start purchasing euro zone debt in the secondary market in an effort 
to contain the yields on these instruments.  
The EFSF can provide loans only to euro zone governments. The immediate effect of its 
creation should have been to reduce the probability of an imminent default by heavily indebted 
euro zone countries, possibly at the expense of a somewhat higher probability of default of non-
recipient, euro zone countries that guarantee the EFSF debt.  
  European banks can be materially affected by the creation of the EFSF as well. European 
banks hold large portfolios of European sovereign debt, and the market value of these debts is 
impacted immediately by a change in the creditworthiness of euro zone governments. More 
indirectly, European banks rely on their national governments for bailout support in case they 
experience financial distress. The existence of the EFSF increases the access to finance for 
heavily indebted euro zone countries, thereby making it more likely that these countries can 
support their distressed banks. However, the EFSF reduces the residual fiscal capacity of its 
guarantor countries, possibly reducing the value of their financial safety nets to their resident 
banks. This suggests that the impact of the EFSF on euro zone banks depends on the size and 
composition of their sovereign debt portfolios and also on their country of residence. 
The announcement of the EFSF triggered strong reactions in financial markets. European 
bank share prices rose sharply on the Monday after the announcement, to give back most gains in 
the following days. CDS spreads on bank liabilities and on sovereign debts, in turn, fell 
immediately and remained at lower levels in subsequent trading sessions. 
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This paper presents an event study of the impact of the EFSF announcement on bank 
share prices, bank CDS spreads, and sovereign CDS spreads. In particular, we relate movements 
in these market prices to data on bank-level sovereign debt portfolios, as made available by the 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) following EU-wide bank stress tests in 
early 2010, to information about bank location and, in the case of bank share price movements, 
to information on government indebtedness.2 The bank stock excess return regressions are based 
on a sample of 48 European banks, while the bank CDS regressions use data for 44 banks. The 
sample of country-level CDS spreads contains 19 observations. 
Our main results are as follows. Bank stock excess returns are positively related to bank 
exposures to Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (the GIIPS countries). This suggests that 
the EFSF announcement strengthened the creditworthiness of GIIPS countries. In addition, we 
find evidence that banks located in GIIPS countries benefited from the creation of the EFSF. 
Banks located in GIIPS countries may have benefited independently of their GIIPS sovereign 
exposure, as the EFSF increases the ability of GIIPS countries to provide generous bailout 
support in case of bank distress. 
Changes in bank CDS spreads, in turn, are negatively related to banks’ GIIPS sovereign 
exposures, but they are positively related to banks’ non-GIIPS euro zone sovereign exposures. 
This is evidence that the EFSF announcement led to an increased valuation of GIIPS debt as 
reflected in bank CDS spreads, and to a reduced valuation of non-GIIPS euro zone debt. This 
may reflect that the creation of EFSF improved the repayment prospects for GIIPS countries, at 
the expense of reduced repayment prospects for non-GIIPS euro zone countries.  
Finally, sovereign CDS spreads declined with a national banking system’s exposure to 
GIIPS sovereign debt, while they increased with a national banking system’s exposure to non-
GIIPS euro zone debt. Sovereign CDS spreads thus reflect the impact of the EFSF on the 
stability of national banking system, as affected by their holdings of GIIPS and non-GIIPS euro 
zone debt. We further find some evidence that the CDS spreads of GIIPS countries declined 
independently of their banking systems’ holdings of GIIPS sovereign debt. A caveat is that these 
                                                
2 The CEBS was the precursor of the European Banking Authority that was established on January 1, 2011. Using 
data provided by the CEBS and the EBA, Acharya and Steffen (2013) analyze the motivations of EU banks to invest 
in sovereign debt. 
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results are based on a small sample of only 19 countries. All the same, this paper provides some 
evidence that the EFSF bailed out GIIPS countries indirectly through its impact on national 
banking systems that are heavily invested in GIIPS sovereign debt, as well as directly. 
Previously, Veronesi and Zingales (2010) examined the costs and benefits of the large-
scale US government intervention in the financial sector announced on October 13, 2008, which 
took the form of a preferred equity infusion in the nine largest US commercial banks joined by a 
three-year government guarantee on new unsecured bank debt issues. These authors conclude 
that this intervention created a net benefit between $86 and $109 billion arising from a reduction 
in the probability of bankruptcy on the implicit assumption of a solvent US government. In the 
EFSF case, banks do not receive equity injections or credit guarantees, but instead are affected 
through a repricing of their sovereign debt portfolios and of their implicit claims on national 
financial safety nets, against a background of sovereigns with varying degrees of 
creditworthiness. By considering sovereign CDS spreads in this paper, we can infer how the 
EFSF announcement has changed market perceptions of the creditworthiness of EU sovereigns. 
In particular, a reduction in a country’s CDS spread, signaling a higher valuation of its debt, 
suggests that national creditworthiness has increased.  
Several additional papers have examined market reactions to national bank bailouts. 
Ejsing and Lemke (2009) show that the decline in banks’ CDS spreads upon the announcement 
of rescue packages by European governments in 2008 were accompanied by sovereign CDS 
spread rises, as investors may have perceived the bailouts as credit risk transfers from the private 
to the public sector. They also show that both bank and sovereign credit risk is associated with a 
common (Europe-wide) macroeconomic factor, to which the sensitivity of bank (sovereign) CDS 
spreads declined (increased) after the bailout announcements. Attinasi et al. (2009) also 
document private-to-public credit risk transfers induced by European bank bailout 
announcements, and they find that the size of the packages is not significantly correlated with 
changes in risk spreads. They interpret this result as a sign that investors regard the packages as 
commitments to bail out banks, regardless of the size of the present interventions. 
King (2009) carries out an event study of rescue package announcements in six countries, 
including the United States, after the Lehman default. Comparing abnormal bank share price 
movements and CDS spreads, he finds that government interventions primarily benefited 
creditors, whereas stock prices continued to decline after an initial increase in most countries. 
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The exception is the US, where shareholders saw increased valuations, which the author 
attributes to more favorable conditions of the US bailout. The BIS (2009) reaches a similar 
conclusion in its comprehensive analysis of the rescue packages seen between October 2008 and 
April 2009 in ten countries. These bailouts were associated with declining bank CDS spreads, 
but stock prices dropped as well. This suggests that the rescue packages were successful at 
decreasing expected credit losses on bank liabilities. However, the interventions decreased 
existing shareholders’ earning and voting rights, and might have lowered the expected 
profitability of banks. 
Sgherri and Zoli (2009) look into the determinants of European sovereign CDS spreads. 
They find that spread changes are primarily driven by a common time-varying factor, closely 
related to global risk appetite, but that since the beginning of 2009 markets have become more 
concerned about the fiscal consequences of potential bailouts of the domestic financial system 
and future debt dynamics. Similarly, Gerlach et al. (2010) find that sovereign bond spreads are 
determined by an aggregate risk factor and its interactions with indicators of the size and 
structure of national banking sectors. Specifically, when aggregate risk increases countries with 
large banking sectors and low equity ratios experience a greater widening in yield spreads. 
Dieckmann and Plank (2011), in turn, find that a country with a larger financial sector faces 
higher CDS spreads – even after controlling for sovereign leverage, i.e. the government debt to 
GDP ratio. Furthermore, sovereign CDS spreads move together with the health of the financial 
system – this is true for local and global shocks to the financial sector. 
 The two-way feedback between the banking system and the public finances is the focus 
of Acharya et al. (2011), who provide a theoretical model of how banking and sovereign CDS 
spreads are interrelated. Bank bailouts lead to a deterioration of the public finances, and they 
increase the incentives to default on sovereign debt. In the model, a large outstanding amount of 
government debt lowers a government's ability to undertake a bailout, and at the same time it 
increases the probability of sovereign default. Panageas (2010a, b) considers bank bailouts in an 
optimal taxation framework, yielding that a government may wish to bail out a bank to prevent 
the deadweight losses associated with a bank collapse.    
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2013) provide empirical evidence that banks may have 
become too big to save. They find that bank valuation is negatively related to public deficits for 
systemically large banks, while banks’ CDS spreads are positively related to public deficits. 
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These results suggest that countries are experiencing fiscal constraints in providing a financial 
safety net to their banks. 
 The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the data. Section 3 presents 
the empirical results as related to the initial announcement of the EFSF on May 9, 2010. In 
addition, in analogous fashion we consider some of the implications of the announcement of a 
planned expansion of the funds available to the EFSF from €440 billion to €780 billion on June 
24, 2011. Section 4 provides some calculations of the impact of the original creation of the EFSF 
on the absolute values of bank shares, bank liabilities, and bank sovereign portfolios. Section 5 
concludes. 
2 The+data+
We obtain data on banks’ exposures to government debts of EU member states from the  
EU-wide stress tests conducted under the auspices of the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors in early 2010. The stress tests covered 91 European banks, representing 65% of the 
European banking market in terms of assets. Our main exposure data are net of impairment and 
cover debt held in both the banking book and the trading book.3 The exposure data and other 
balance sheet variables used in this study reflect consolidated statements. Table 1 provides 
information about banks’ sovereign exposures aggregated by country of residence. Banks located 
in Germany have the largest aggregate sovereign exposure of €536 billion, followed by French 
and UK banks with €230 billion and €216 billion, respectively.  
We can divide a bank’s sovereign exposure by its total assets to obtain a measure of its 
relative exposure. As seen in Table 1, banks in Greece, Luxemburg, Malta and Poland have an 
exposure-to-assets ratio exceeding 15%, while the average sovereign exposure-to-assets ratio is 
6.01% for the 20 countries in the table.  
 In the empirical analysis, we restrict ourselves to banks that are publicly listed, which 
reduces the sample to 48 banks. Sovereign debt-to-assets ratios for the 48 individual banks in our 
sample are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. For these banks, bank stock excess returns are 
calculated using stock price value data obtained from Datastream for one-day, three-day, and 
                                                
3 We use exposure data net of credit risk mitigation, for instance, through hedging. For three banks, in particular 
KBC Bank, Dexia and Hypo Real Estate, such net figures are not available, and instead we use figures gross of 
credit risk mitigation. 
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five-day event windows centered on the event date of May 10, 2010. Specifically, we calculate 
excess return, , of bank i for an event window of L days using the following formula: 
 
where  is the closing market value of bank i on day s in euros, and t is the event day of May 
10, 2010, which is the first trading day following the announcement.  In this expression,  is the 
estimated market beta of bank i based on a 6-month sample of daily returns in the period from 
the beginning of October 2009 to the end of March 2010. As a proxy for the market portfolio, we 
use the MSCI World Index in euros.4  
 As measures of changes in bank and sovereign debt values, we use CDS spread changes 
over the event windows.5 We use CDS spreads on senior unsecured bonds for five-year 
contracts, as these contracts are the most liquid.6 Also, we restrict the sample to CDS contracts 
with a modified restructuring (MR) clause in the case of banks following Jorion and Zhang 
(2007).7 This yields a sample of 44 bank CDS spread changes, and a sample of 19 sovereign 
CDS spread changes for EU countries where at least one of the banks included in the stress test 
conducted by the CEBS is located. All CDS spread data are taken from Datastream.  
At the country level, we use the Government debt variable as an index of the state of a 
country’s public finances. This variable is constructed as the consolidated gross debt of the 
general government as a percentage of GDP at the end of 2009. Government debt data are 
obtained from Eurostat. Finally, we construct a dummy variable for banks that indicates whether 
a bank is located in a GIIPS country, and we construct a dummy variable for countries signaling 
whether a country is a GIIPS country. 
 Figure 1 plots the average excess returns for banks located in GIIPS countries and other 
EU countries during the period from 30 trading days before May 10, 2010 to 30 trading days 
                                                
4 We calculate excess returns relative to a worldwide stock market index, as the event had a material effect on 
national market indices. In the empirical work, we consider bank stock excess returns relative to the MSCI Europe 
Index and national stock market indices in robustness checks. 
5 We do not to work with abnormal or excess CDS spread changes, as the announcement might have had a 
significant effect on CDS spread indices. 
6 In the empirical work, we also consider CDS spreads for subordinated bank debt in a robustness check. 
7 Modified restructuring clauses are part of the ISDA documentation since 2001. MR limits the maturity of 
obligations to be delivered after the credit event. 
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after this date. Bank share prices declined considerably especially in GIIPS countries prior to the 
event day. On the event day, bank stocks experienced excess returns of on average 8.4% for the 
48 banks in our sample, with bank shares in GIIPS countries rising relatively more. However, 
bank share prices partially reversed their gains in subsequent days. Over a three-day event 
window, the average bank stock excess return had declined to 4.1%, while over a five-day event 
window it only was 1.8%.  
 The large initial increase in bank stock prices following the EFSF announcement suggests 
that this announcement was not anticipated by bank stock investors.8 The decline in the 
immediate bank share gains following the announcement, in turn, cannot be explained by 
additional news with severe negative implications for bank valuations, as is evident from a 
summary of events surrounding the event day of May 10, 2010 provided in Table A2 in the 
Appendix. Instead, the reversal of some initial bank stock gains appears to reflect a reappraisal of 
the implications of the announcement itself for bank valuation. Similar patterns of stock price 
movements after the announcements of national bank rescue packages in the fall of 2008 are 
noted by King (2009) and the BIS (2009). In all these instances, bank stock investors appear to 
have concluded that the bailouts primarily are to the benefit of bank creditors. 
 In analogous fashion, Figure 1 plots the development of average CDS spreads for banks 
located in GIIPS countries and other EU countries during the period around the EFSF 
announcement. Throughout this period, banks located in GIIPS countries have significantly 
higher CDS spreads than banks located in other EU countries. CDS spreads for both groups of 
banks rose sharply prior to the event day, to decline subsequently. The average one-day decline 
in average bank CDS spread following the event was 44.8 basis points. Over three-day and five-
                                                
8 Related news articles that appeared in the Financial Times and the Wall Street Journal between May 5, 2010 and 
May 12, 2010 can be summarized as follows. Prior to the EFSF announcement, articles were dominated by fears of 
contagion from the Greek sovereign debt crisis. Several articles pointed out that the previously constructed Greek 
bailout package was insufficient to contain the crisis. While there was speculation about the possible involvement of 
the ECB to buy sovereign debt of ailing countries, the announcement of a further euro-zone-wide bailout package 
was not perceived as imminent. There was fear of a lack of political ability to devise a sustainable solution to the 
crisis. Some observers noted that European policymakers had hoped that renewed economic growth would solve the 
crisis, making additional interventions unnecessary. Articles on Monday and Tuesday following the EFSF 
announcement report huge stock market gains all over the world, especially in the financial sector. These articles 
suggest that investors did not anticipate the creation of euro-zone-wide stability fund prior to the announcement. 
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day event windows, the declines in average bank CDS spreads were somewhat smaller at 40.1 
and 31.3 basis points, respectively.  
Figure 1 also displays the average country-level CDS spreads for GIIPS countries and 
other EU countries before and after the EFSF announcement. As in the case of bank CDS 
spreads, average country CDS spreads rose sharply before the event day and fell off significantly 
afterwards, especially for GIIPS countries. In fact, the developments of average bank and 
country CDS spreads in Figure 1 for GIIPS countries and non-GIIPS countries are remarkably 
similar, indicating that market operators see the fortunes of banks and their countries of 
residence as tightly linked.9 The average decline in country CDS spreads over one-day, three-
day, and five-day event windows is rather stable at 52.9, 54.5 and 51.5 basis points, respectively.  
Table 2 provides formal tests of whether the mean bank stock excess returns, and changes 
in bank and country CDS spreads over the various event windows are different from zero. The 
mean values of the excess returns and CDS spread changes are in all instances seen to be 
statistically different from zero at the 5% level.10 
 To conclude this section, Figure 2 provides plots of bank excess returns and bank and 
country CDS spreads around the EFSF announcement for 8 selected EU countries: France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Bank 
stock excess returns, specifically, are measured cumulatively relative to 30 days prior to May 10, 
2010. These excess bank stock returns decline for most countries until the EFSF announcement, 
after which they are relatively stable. The exceptions are Greece and Ireland, where cumulative 
bank stock excess returns continued to decline after the announcement date. The individual-
country pictures confirm that both bank and country CDS spreads increased gradually before the 
EFSF announcement. Greek sovereign CDS spreads, in particular, increased from an initial 309 
basis points on April 1 to 893 basis points on April 27, when Standard & Poor’s downgraded 
Greek debt to junk status. During the same period, the insurance cost of German sovereign risk 
climbed from 30 basis points to 52 basis points, a remarkable 73% increase. Following initial 
                                                
9 See also Sgherri and Zoli (2009) and Dieckmann and Plank (2011) for evidence on the co-movement of bank and 
country CDS spreads at a time of financial crisis. 
10 Extending the event window forward to six days yields a negative and statistically significant mean cumulative 
excess stock return of -0.013. Even though this unconditional mean is negative, we find that extending the window 
to six days does not materially affect our results regarding the impact of bank exposure to sovereign debt on bank 
stock excess returns in unreported regressions. 
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declines in bank and country CDS spreads after the EFSF announcement, bank and country CDS 
spreads generally went up again. 
 Table 3 provides descriptive statistics and correlation matrices for variables used in the 
bank stock excess return regressions (in Panel A), the bank CDS spread change regressions (in 
Panel B), and the sovereign CDS spread change regressions (in Panel C). The table indicates that 
a bank’s exposure to GIIPS sovereign debt is highly correlated with whether or not it is located 
in a GIIPS country.  In particular, in Panel A we see that the correlation between the GIIPS 
exposure variable for banks and the GIIPS location variable is 0.591. 
3 Empirical++results+
In subsection 3.1, we consider the implications of the initial EFSF announcement of May 
9, 2010 for bank stock excess returns. Subsections 3.2 and 3.3 in turn examine the impact of this 
event on bank CDS spreads and sovereign CDS spreads. Finally, subsection 3.4 presents some 
results regarding the effects of the announcement of the EFSF enlargement on June 24, 2011 on 
the same set of financial variables.  
 
3.1 Initial+announcement+and+bank+stock+excess+returns+
In Table 4, the dependent variable is the bank stock excess stock return calculated over a 
five-day event window. Standard errors control for clustering at the country level. In regression 
1, the bank stock excess return is related to a bank’s total EU sovereign debt exposure relative to 
bank assets and to the GIIPS location variable that indicates whether a bank is located in a GIIPS 
country. The total exposure variable is estimated with an insignificant coefficient, while the 
GIIPS location variable is estimated with a positive coefficient of 0.039 that is significant at 5%. 
Regression 2 replaces the total exposure variable by separate variables for a bank’s sovereign 
exposures to GIIPS countries, non-GIIPS euro zone countries, and non-euro zone countries, all 
relative to assets. In this regression, the GIIPS location variable obtains a coefficient of 0.018 
that is insignificant. Among the exposure variables, the GIIPS exposure variable obtains a 
coefficient of 0.225 that is significant at 1%, while the other two exposure variables are 
estimated with insignificant coefficients. The estimated coefficient of 0.225 for the GIIPS 
exposure variable implies that an increase in the GIIPS variable by one standard deviation of 
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0.07 (as seen in Table 3, Panel A) is estimated to increase the bank excess return by 0.016 
(=0.225*0.07), which is about a third of the standard deviation of the excess return of 0.05. Thus, 
the impact of a bank’s GIIPS exposure on its excess return is economically significant. 
Regression 3 includes the national government debt-to-GDP ratio, starting from 
regression 2. In this regression, the GIIPS location dummy and the GIIPS exposure variable 
obtain positive coefficients that are significant at 5% and 1%, respectively. This suggests that the 
EFSF announcement represented a bail-out of banks located in GIIPS countries as well as of 
banks heavily exposed to GIIPS debt. The government debt variable receives a negative 
coefficient of -0.001 that is significant at 10%, perhaps reflecting that bank stock investors in 
heavily indebted euro zone countries were disappointed by the scale and scope of the EFSF, as 
they realized that any benefits from EFSF would accrue disproportionately to bank debt holders 
rather than to bank shareholders.  
Regression 4 replaces the GIIPS exposure variable by two separate variables that measure 
a bank’s domestic GIIPS exposure, if it is located in a GIIPS country, and the bank’s foreign 
GIIPS exposure starting from regression 2. Both the domestic and foreign GIIPS exposure 
variables obtain positive coefficients, but only the former one is statistically significant. The 
insignificance of the foreign GIIPS exposure variable perhaps reflects that foreign GIIPS 
exposure is relatively small, with the mean foreign GIIPS variable only being about a fourth of 
the domestic GIIPS variable as seen in Panel A of Table 3. 
Next, Table 4 provides several robustness checks based on regressions 1 and 3 of this 
table.  First, we consider the implications for statistical inference of our rather small sample size 
of 48 observations. For such a small sample, statistical inference may be importantly affected by 
the assumed distribution of the disturbances. To check this, we calculate bootstrapped standard 
errors, with the results presented as regressions 5-6 of Table 4.11  The GIIPS location variable is 
seen to be statistically significant at the 5% level in regression 5, and it is statistically significant 
at 10% in regression 6, very similar to the corresponding results in regressions 1 and 3. The 
estimated coefficient for the GIIPS exposure variable is positive and significant at 5% in 
regression 6, while the government debt variable is not significant in this regression.  
                                                
11 We applied standard non-parametric bootstrapping where we resampled observations (with replacement) 1000 
times to calculate t-statistics. 
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Next, we compute bank stock excess returns relative to the MSCI Europe Index rather 
than the MSCI World Index. The MSCI Europe Index offers a more relevant stock market 
benchmark for computing European bank stock excess returns to the extent that the European 
stock market is segmented from the world stock market. However, the European index is a worse 
comparator index insofar as European non-financial firms are impacted by the EFSF 
announcement as well, for instance through changed credit market conditions. Results for bank 
stock excess return regressions using the European index analogous are reported as regressions 7 
and 8. In regression 7, the overall exposure variable obtains a positive coefficient that is 
significant at 10%. Otherwise, the results of regressions 7 and 8 are very similar to regression 1 
and 3. 
 Next, we compute bank stock excess returns relative to national stock market indices 
rather than the MSCI World Index, with the resulting excess return regressions reported as 
regressions 9 and 10 in Table 4. In these regressions, the estimated coefficients for the GIIPS 
location variable are statistically insignificant. The GIIPS exposure variable, however, enters 
regression 10 with a positive coefficient that is significant at 1%, while the government debt 
variable enters with a negative coefficient that is significant at 1%. 
Finally, we acknowledge that banks can hold sovereign debt in their banking book or in 
their trading book. Assets held in the banking book generally are held long-term and their 
valuation tends to be close to historical cost. Assets in the trading book, in turn, are available for 
sale and tend to be valued at fair value. Banks in our sample held 79% of their sovereign debt in 
their banking books at the time of the EFSF announcement. The excess return regressions 11 and 
12 include sovereign exposure variables that only include sovereign debt held in the banking 
book, thus focusing on assets that are held for the longer term. The estimated coefficients in 
these regressions are very similar to those in regressions 1 and 3. 
Overall, the results of Table 4 provide evidence that the EFSF announcement benefited 
banks heavily exposed to GIIPS sovereign debt or located in GIIPS countries.  
 
3.2 Initial+announcement+and+bank+CDS+spread+changes+
Table 5 shows the results of regressions of 5-year bank CDS spread changes in five-day 
windows around the announcement. Analogously to regression 1 of Table 4, regression 1 of 
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Table 5 relates the bank CDS spread change to the total sovereign debt exposure variable and to 
the GIIPS location variable for a sample of 44 banks. The total exposure variable is estimated 
with an insignificant coefficient, while the GIIPS location variable is estimated with a negative 
coefficient that is significant at 5%. The EFSF announcement thus appears to have reduced 
expected credit losses on the senior debts of banks located in GIIPS countries. In regression 2, 
the total exposure variable is split into exposures to the GIIPS countries, the non-GIIPS euro 
zone countries, and the non-euro zone countries. Now the GIIPS location variable enters with an 
insignificant coefficient. Among the exposure variables, the GIIPS exposure variable obtains a 
negative coefficient that is insignificant, and the non-GIIPS EMU exposure variable obtains a 
positive coefficient that is significant at 5%. This suggests that the EFSF initiative has reduced 
the solidity of non-GIIPS euro zone sovereign debt as the pertinent countries have taken on 
additional liabilities by joining the EFSF. The GIIPS location and GIIPS exposure variables, as 
included in regression 2, have a high correlation of 0.741, which makes it difficult to precisely 
estimate their separate effects on bank CDS spread changes. In regression 3, we exclude the 
GIIPS location variable, but we retain the GIIPS exposure variable. In this regression, the GIIPS 
exposure variable is estimated with a negative coefficient that is significant at 1%, and the non-
GIIPS EMU exposure variable is estimated with a positive coefficient that is significant at 10%. 
In regression 4, we split the GIIPS exposure variable into separate domestic GIIPS exposure and 
foreign GIIPS exposure variables. These two variables obtain negative coefficients of similar 
magnitude, but only the first one is statistically significant, perhaps reflecting the dominance of 
domestic GIIPS exposure. In this regression, the non-GIIPS exposure variable obtains a positive 
coefficient, but it is statistically insignificant. 
Next, the table reports the results of several robustness checks as applied to regressions 1 
and 2 of Table 5. To start, regressions 5 and 6 report errors obtained by bootstrapping. The 
GIIPS location variable obtains a coefficient that is negative and significant at 5% in regression 
5, while no variable is estimated with significance in regression 6. 
In regressions 7 and 8, the dependent variable is the CDS spread change related to 
subordinated bank debt rather than senior bank debt, which reduces the number of observations 
from 44 to 35. In regression 7, the GIIPS location variable receives a negative coefficient that is 
significant at 10%. In regression 8 the GIIPS exposure variable obtains a negative coefficient 
that is significant at 10%. The latter result provides some evidence that the EFSF initiative 
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reduced the expected credit losses on bank debt of banks with exposures to GIIPS debt, even if 
we control for whether or not banks are located in a GIIPS country. Finally, regressions 9 and 10 
include exposure variables that only reflect a bank’s sovereign exposures as held in the banking 
book. The results are very similar to those reported in regressions 1 and 2.  
Overall, Table 5 provides some evidence that the EFSF announcement caused CDS 
spreads to decline for banks located in GIIPS countries and with GIIPS exposure, while it caused 
CDS spreads to increase for banks with non-GIIPS euro zone exposure. This suggests that the 
EFSF served to transfer creditworthiness from non-GIIPS euro zone countries to GIIPS 
countries. 
 
3.3 Initial+announcement+and+country+CDS+spread+changes+
Table 6 presents the results of regressions of changes in sovereign CDS spreads in five-
day windows around the announcement. The sample contains a limited number of 19 countries 
where at least one of the banks included in the stress test conducted by the CEBS is located. 
Regressions 1-3 in Table 6 are analogous to regressions 1-3 of Table 5, with the proviso that 
sovereign CDS spread changes are related to sovereign debt exposures of entire national banking 
systems relative to GDP – rather than to sovereign debt exposures of individual banks relative to 
bank assets. In regression 1, the overall exposure variable is insignificant, while the GIIPS 
country variable obtains a negative coefficient that is significant at 1%. The EFSF initiative thus 
appears to have reduced expected credit losses on GIIPS sovereign debt. In regression 2, the 
coefficients for the GIIPS country and GIIPS exposure variables are estimated with negative 
coefficients that are significant at 5% and 10%, respectively. This suggests that GIIPS countries 
and countries with banking systems exposed to GIIPS sovereign debt saw their public 
creditworthiness improve. In regression 3, the GIIPS exposure variable receives a negative 
coefficient that is significant at 1%, while the non-GIIPS EMU exposure variable receives a 
positive coefficient that is significant at 5%. Thus, countries with banking systems with 
exposures to GIIPS countries and non-GIIPS euro zone countries saw their creditworthiness 
improve and decline, respectively. In regression 4, we split the GIIPS exposure variable into its 
domestic and foreign components, starting from regression 2. In this regression, the domestic 
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GIIPS exposure variable obtains a coefficient that is negative and significant, while the foreign 
GIIPS exposure variable is estimated with a negative and insignificant coefficient.  
As a robustness check, columns 5-7 report bootstrapped standard errors for regression 1-
3. We see that the GIIPS country variable enters column 5 with a negative coefficient that is 
significant at 1%, while the non-GIIPS EMU exposure variable enters column 7 with a positive 
coefficient that is significant at 5%.  
Overall, the results reported in Table 6 provide evidence that national creditworthiness 
improved for GIIPS countries and for countries with banking systems exposed to GIIPS debt 
following the EFSF announcement, while it declined for countries with banking systems exposed 
to non-GIIPS euro zone country debt. This evidence, however, is only suggestive as it is based 
on a small sample of only 19 countries. 
 
3.4 Announcement+of+the+EFSF+enlargement+
On June 24, 2011, the EU heads of state and government announced an enlargement of 
the funds available to the EFSF from the original €440 billion to €780, representing a 77% 
increase. The announcement of an EFSF enlargement per se was not surprising as it was widely 
recognized that the EFSF, as originally conceived, was too small to fund major euro zone 
countries such as Spain or Italy for a significant amount of time, if needed. This suggests that the 
announcement of an EFSF expansion on June 24, 2011 to some extent was already priced into 
bank share prices and bank and sovereign CDS contracts.12 All the same, there was considerable 
uncertainty about the size of any EFSF enlargement, in case euro zone countries would agree that 
an enlargement was necessary. In this subsection, we present some results on how the 
                                                
12 A review of related new articles that appeared in the Financial Times and the Wall Street Journal between June 
20, 2011 and June 27, 2011 reveals that plans to extend the effective lending capacity of the EFSF were discussed 
prior to the announcement in the Financial Times of June 20, 2011. Around the announcement date, several related 
events occurred. Specifically, changes were planned to the rules of the future European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
In addition, on June 23, 2011 officials of Greece, the EU and the IMF agreed on plans for further spending cuts and 
tax increases. Following the announcement, the euro as well as certain Italian bank stocks plunged, possibly because 
of fears that the steps taken thus far would not prevent the spread of the debt crisis. These news reports suggest that 
some effects of the announcement of the EFSF expansion could already have been priced beforehand, and that the 
impact of the enlargement of the EFSF cannot be fully separated from other related events.  
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announcement of the EFSF enlargement impacted bank stock excess returns and changes in bank 
and sovereign CDS spreads in a five-day event window centered around June 24, 2011.  
 To start, regressions 1-3 of Table 7 present the results of bank stock excess returns 
regressions analogous to regressions 1-3 of Table 4. In regression 1, we see that the GIIPS 
location variable obtains a negative coefficient that is significant at 1%. This may reflect that 
shareholders of banks located in GIIPS countries were disappointed by the announced EFSF 
enlargement, as they expected it to be bigger. In regression 2, the non-GIIPS EMU exposure 
variable obtains a positive coefficient that is significant at 10%, suggesting that the enlargement 
announcement positively affected the valuation of non-GIIPS euro zone sovereign debt (as the 
small size of the announced enlargement contained the implied reduction of the creditworthiness 
of non-GIIPS euro zone sovereigns).  
 Next, we report the results of bank CDS spread change regressions analogous to 
regressions 1 and 2 of Table 5 as regressions 4 and 5 of Table 7. In regression 4, the GIIPS 
location variable is estimated with a positive coefficient that is significant at 1%, indicating a 
reduced creditworthiness of banks located in GIIPS countries. This is consistent with the view 
that the announced enlargement of the EFSF was smaller than previously expected.  
 Finally, the corresponding regressions for sovereign CDS spread changes are represented 
as regressions 6 and 7. In regressions 6 and 7, the GIIPS country variable enters with positive 
coefficients that are significant at 1% and 10%, respectively. Furthermore, in regression 7 the 
banking-system GIIPS exposure variable obtains a positive coefficient that is significant at 10%. 
These results, and the findings in Table 7 generally, are consistent with an announced 
enlargement of the EFSF that fell short of expectations.  
4 The+overall+valuation+effects+of+the+initial+EFSF+announcement+
In this section we use the regression results and actual market movements to quantify the 
effects of the initial EFSF announcement for the market values of bank shares, bank liabilities 
and bank portfolios of sovereign debts. 
Changes in stock valuations are obtained in a standard way: excess returns over the five-
day event window are multiplied by the market value of shares at the beginning of the event 
window. 
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Changes in the market values of bank liabilities and sovereign debt portfolios are 
calculated in a somewhat more involved way by capitalizing changes in CDS spreads 
analogously to Veronesi and Zingales (2010). Specifically, we take the change in the market 
value of a debt instrument to be the change in the presented discounted value of the cost of 
insuring the principal against default up to the maturity of the instrument using the CDS market 
as follows13  
  ,          (1) 
where E is the market value of a debt exposure and I is the market value of insuring against 
default. 
 The present value of the insurance cost is  
        (2) 
where  is the amount of existing debt that will not have matured by time ,  is the risk 
free discount factor,  is the probability of not defaulting up to time , and  is the maximum 
maturity of the debt. Note that a division by 10 000 is necessary, because CDS spreads are in 
basis points. Equations 1 and 2 imply  
                          (3) 
where subscript 1 denotes values after the event, and subscript 0 denotes values before the event.  
We assume that the instantaneous probability of default is constant. In this case, we 
obtain  from the formula where  is the recovery rate in the event of 
default (see the Appendix of Veronesi and Zingales (2010)). The recovery rate is set to 0.6, 
which is a standard assumption in CDS markets. For simplicity, we assume a constant risk-free 
interest rate equal to 2% per annum. The discount factor is then , where  
denotes time. We assume that the average maturity of bank liabilities is 5 years for all banks, 
while that of government bonds is 4 years for all countries.14 Further, we assume that in each 
                                                
13 We ignore that over the event window the market value of a debt instrument may alternatively have changed due 
to a change in the risk-free interest rate. 
14 On average these figures seem to be reasonable, see, for example, The Economist, Cutting it fine, May 7, 2011. 
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year the same nominal amount of debt matures, or one fifth of the initial nominal stock of bank 
liabilities and one quarter of the initial stock of government bonds. 
 We first consider the changes in the market value of bank portfolios of GIIPS debt and its 
implication for the market valuation of bank shares and bank liabilities. Specifically, column 1 of 
Panel A of Table 8 provides the changes in the market value of banks’ GIIPS debt – aggregated 
by country of bank location – using the above methodology. The total change in the market value 
of GIIPS debt for the 35 banks in our sample, for which we also have CDS spread data, is around 
€12.7 billion.  
Column 2 shows our estimates of the changes in the market value of bank liabilities due 
to banks’ exposure to GIIPS sovereign debt. These figures are obtained as follows. Using 
regression 2 in Table 5 we predict banks’ CDS spread changes associated with their GIIPS 
exposure (as the product of the coefficient on the GIIPS exposure variable, estimated at -
261.485, and each bank’s exposure to this set of countries). We then use equation 3 to obtain an 
approximation of the change in the market value of bank liabilities. The bank liabilities used in 
this calculation exclude customer deposits, as the valuation of these liabilities is not expected to 
change substantially on account of explicit deposit insurance and a high seniority. In the table, 
we see that the calculated change in the market value of bank liabilities associated with their 
GIIPS exposure is €10.2 billion.  
Unfortunately, this estimate of the change in the value of bank liabilities on account of 
banks’ GIIPS exposure is rather imprecise, as the coefficient of -261.485 in regression 2 of Table 
5, on which this estimate is based, is not statistically significant. The corresponding estimated 
coefficient of -545.399 in regression 3 of Table 5, however, is significant at 1%. As a check, we 
redo the calculations of the presumed changes in the market value of bank liabilities due to 
banks’ GIIPS exposure using this alternative estimate of the relevant coefficient, with the results 
reported in column 3. This yields an estimated increase in the value of bank liabilities of €21.3 
billion. This amount can be interpreted as a high estimate.   
Next, column 4 shows estimates of the change in the market value of bank shares 
associated with their GIIPS exposure, which is calculated as follows. Using regression 2 in Table 
4, we predict the excess returns associated with banks’ exposure to GIIPS government debt. The 
product of these figures and the market values of banks before the event window gives the 
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predicted changes in banks’ stock market value. For the entire sample of banks, we calculate the 
change in market value associated with GIIPS debt to be €3.9 billion.  
Columns 5 and 6 provide two alternative estimates of the changes in the total valuations 
of investor claims on banks - as related to their GIIPS exposure at the time of the EFSF 
announcement. Column 5, specifically, adds up the calculated changes in the market values of 
bank liabilities in column 2 and the changes in the market values of shares in column 4. 
Alternatively, column 6 provides the sum of the calculated changes in the market value of bank 
liabilities in column 3 and the changes in market values of shares in column 4. As seen in the 
table, column 5 provides a low estimate of the change in the total value of debt and equity claims 
on banks of €14.1 billion, while column 6 provides a corresponding high estimate of €25.2 
billion. Either estimate is higher than the calculated change in the market value of their GIIPS 
itself exposure (at €12.7 billion in column 1). Some of this difference may be due to lower 
expected bankruptcy costs for banks as borne by bank shareholders and liability holders. This 
would represent an efficiency gain due to the announcement. Alternatively, combined bank 
liability holder and shareholder gains may be relatively high, as the event increased the fiscal 
capacity of distressed countries within the euro zone, thereby increasing the value of the 
contingent claim that banks in these countries have on their financial safety nets.  
Next, we present some calculations of the changes in the valuation of overall sovereign 
debt portfolios, overall bank liabilities, and overall bank share prices over the five-day event 
window using only market data. Specifically, column 1 of Panel B of Table 8 provides 
calculations of the changes in the overall values of banks’ sovereign debt portfolios – again 
aggregated at the level of the country of bank location. The change in the total value of bank 
sovereign exposures is calculated to be €14.5 billion, slightly more than the increase in the value 
of GIIPS exposures of €12.7 billion in column 1 of Panel A. In column 2, we see that the change 
in the value of overall bank liabilities is calculated to be €32.8 billion. In column 3, the change in 
the market values of the 35 banks is calculated to be €9.7 billion. In column 4, we see that the 
sum of the changes in bank liabilities and bank shares adds up to €42.5 billion. This total change 
in the valuation of the claims of bank liability and shareholders is about three times the change in 
the calculated value of sovereign exposures. The difference can again be due to reduced expected 
bankruptcy costs for the banks themselves or a higher value of contingent bank claims on 
national financial safety nets. The final column in the table provides information on the book 
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values of total bank assets for the banks in our sample. Total assets of these 35 banks amount to 
€23.1 trillion.15 The calculated change in the total market valuation of bank liabilities and bank 
shares of €42.5 billion amounts to about 0.18% of the book value of total assets. All the same, 
for a badly capitalized bank the change in the market value of its sovereign exposure could be 
material. 
5 Conclusion+
This paper examines the impact of the announcement of the EFSF on bank share prices, 
bank CDS spreads and sovereign CDS spreads in the EU using an event study methodology. 
Bank shareholders experienced positive excess returns to the extent that their banks held 
the sovereign debts of GIIPS countries. Bank liability holders of banks invested in GIIPS 
sovereign debt similarly gained, as reflected in lower bank CDS spreads. At the country level, we 
find that sovereign CDS spreads declined with the magnitude of national banking systems’ 
exposure to GIIPS debt. This all suggests that the EFSF served to bail out banks that were 
invested in GIIPS debt. 
In addition, we find that bank shareholders of banks located in GIIPS countries 
experienced more positive returns, even after we control for banks’ holdings of GIIPS public 
debt. This may reflect that the EFSF increased the reliability of the financial safety net in GIIPS 
countries, as it increased the capacity of GIIPS countries to finance bank bailouts. Regarding 
sovereign CDS spreads, along similar lines we find that the CDS spreads of GIIPS sovereigns 
declined, independently of their national banking systems’ exposure to GIIPS sovereign debt. 
Hence, the creation of the EFSF appears to have bailed out GIIPS sovereigns indirectly, through 
its impact on national banking systems, as well as directly. A caveat is that this paper’s results 
are based on rather small samples of banks and countries. 
Calculations of the quantitative impact of the EFSF announcement on the valuation of 
bank shares and liabilities shows that most of the gains accrued to bank liability holders rather 
than to bank shareholders. Interestingly, the computed combined gains to bank shareholders and 
                                                
15 The total assets of all banks located in the EU amounted to €76.1 trillion in 2009 based on Bankscope data. This 
suggests that our sample of 35 banks represents 30.3% of the entire EU banking market. Therefore, a rough 
approximation of the valuation effects of the EFSF announcement for all EU banks can be obtained by scaling up 
our estimates by the factor 3.30 (= 76.1/23.1). 
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bank liability holders considerably exceed the direct increase in the valuation of GIIPS sovereign 
debt on the books of the banks. This probably reflects that the creation of the EFSF strengthened 
the perceived reliability of the financial safety net in the euro zone. This is not surprising as the 
EFSF was designed as a general vehicle for intra-euro zone sovereign lending to less 
creditworthy euro zone governments, rather than simply as some implicit mutual guarantee of 
previously issued GIIPS sovereign debt.  
While the EFSF announcement benefited bank shareholders and bank liability holders to 
the extent that their banks held GIIPS sovereign debt, it was no free lunch. This is made clear by 
the fact that bank CDS spreads increased for banks with considerable exposures to non-GIIPS 
euro zone sovereign debt, while similarly country CDS spreads increased with the size of 
national banking system exposure to this type of sovereign debt. This is consistent with the view 
that the EFSF reduced the quality of non-GIIPS euro zone sovereign debt, and in fact transferred 
some creditworthiness from the non-GIIPS euro zone countries to the GIIPS countries. The fact 
that the EFSF effectively transfers creditworthiness among euro zone countries implies that there 
is a limit to how far the EFSF or similar institutions can be scaled up and still be effective.  
The existence of a limited potential to expand the EFSF was illustrated by the announced 
enlargement of the EFSF on June 24, 2011, from an initial size of €440 billion to €780 billion.  
We find evidence that the size of this expansion was smaller than expected, as shown by 
negative returns for bank shareholders and higher CDS spreads for banks located in GIIPS 
countries, as well as higher sovereign CDS spreads in these countries. 
 The EFSF was created as a temporary rescue fund. In October 2010, the euro zone 
countries decided to create a permanent rescue mechanism, the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM). The ESM entered into force on 8 October 2012. In parallel to the ESM, however, the 
EFSF continues to provide loans as part of the ongoing programs for Greece, Portugal and 
Ireland.16 
Intending to limit future bail-outs of banks in the EU, in June 2013 the European 
Commission published a draft European directive on a framework for the recovery and 
resolution of credit institutions and investment firms. This directive severely restricts the 
                                                
16 See http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/index.htm. 
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potential for national authorities and for the ESM to provide bail-out moneys in future bank 
resolutions, and instead provides for a mandated bail-in of bank creditors. The publication of this 
draft directive follows the bail-in of Cypriot banks in 2013, which caused bank creditors, 
including the owners of deposits in excess of 100,000 euros, to lose part of their claims. 
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Appendix+
Table A1. Sovereign exposure to total assets ratios for individual banks in percent. 
The 48 banks in this table correspond to the sample for bank excess return regressions presented in Table 4. 
 
Country Bank Sovereign debt exposure to assets in percent 
Austria Erste Group Bank AG 12.46 
 
Raiffeisen Zentralbank Oesterreich AG - RZB 7.64 
Belgium Dexia 9.82 
 
KBC Group 14.72 
Cyprus Marfin Popular Bank Public Co Ltd 9.15 
 
Bank Of Cyprus Public Co Ltd 8.95 
Denmark Danske Bank 5.90 
 
Jyske Bank 2.35 
 
Sydbank 0.97 
Finland Op-Pohjola Group 1.31 
France BNP Paribas 4.17 
 
Crédit Agricole-Crédit Agricole Group 3.28 
 
Société Générale 3.49 
Germany Deutsche Bank AG 1.90 
 
Commerzbank AG 8.04 
 
Landesbank Berlin AG 13.62 
 
Deutsche Postbank AG 7.66 
Greece EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA 12.00 
 
National Bank of Greece SA 18.52 
 
Alpha Bank AE 7.57 
 
Piraeus Bank SA 16.63 
 
Agricultural Bank of Greece 34.54 
 
TT Hellenic Postbank S.A 33.07 
Hungary FHB Jelzálogbank Nyilvánosan Működő Rt 11.37 
 
OTP Bank Plc 14.41 
Ireland Allied Irish Banks Plc 5.33 
 
Bank of Ireland 0.71 
Italy Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.a. 10.65 
 
UniCredit S.p.a. 8.30 
 
Banca Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena S.p.a. 4.22 
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Banco Popolare 7.02 
 
Unione Di Banche Italiane Scpa (UBI Banca) 5.30 
Malta Bank of Valletta Plc 16.01 
Netherlands ING Bank NV 3.82 
Poland Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci Bank Polski SA - PKO BP SA 20.12 
Portugal Banco Comercial Português, SA-Millennium bcp 4.18 
 
Banco Espirito Santo SA 2.76 
 
Banco BPI SA 14.38 
Spain Banco Santander SA 5.57 
 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA 9.74 
Sweden Nordea Bank AB (publ) 4.30 
 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 6.24 
 
Svenska Handelsbanken 3.49 
 
Swedbank AB 0.20 
United Kingdom Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc (The) 4.77 
 
HSBC Holdings Plc 3.34 
 
Barclays Plc 2.63 
 
Lloyds Banking Group Plc 0.75 
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Table A2. Timeline of events surrounding the creation of the EFSF 
Source: Reuters 
Date News item 
April 11 Euro zone finance ministers approve a €30 billion aid mechanism for Greece, which Athens declines to 
activate. 
April 22 Eurostat says Greece's 2009 budget deficit was 13.6% of GDP, not the 12.7% it had reported. 
April 23 Papandreou asks for activation of EU/IMF aid. 
April 27 Standard & Poor's downgrades Greece's credit rating to junk status. The next day it downgrades Spain's 
rating because of poor growth prospects. 
 Germany approves a €22.4 billion ($30 billion) share. 
 The package amounts to €110 billion over three years and is the first rescue of a member of the 16-nation 
Euro zone. 
May 2 Papandreou says Greece has done a deal with the EU and IMF opening the door to a bailout in exchange 
for extra budget cuts of €30 billion over three years, on top of measures already set. 
May 4/5 Public workers in Greece stage a 48-hour strike. Up to 50,000 protest in Athens. Three people are killed 
when a bank is set on fire. 
May 6 Greek parliament approves latest austerity bill. 
May 9 The IMF unanimously approves its part of the rescue loans, and provides €5.5 billion immediately. 
 The package consists of €440 billion in guarantees from euro zone states, plus €60 billion in a European 
debt instrument. The IMF will contribute €250 billion, taking the total to €750 billion, or around $1 
trillion. 
May 10 Global policymakers install an emergency financial safety net worth €750 billion to bolster financial 
markets and shore up the euro against contagion from the Greek crisis. 
May 11 Germany's cabinet approves the biggest national contribution -- €123 billion in loan guarantees -- to the 
safety net. 
May 12 Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero sets fresh spending cuts of €15 billion in 2010 and 
2011. 
May 13 Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Socrates and opposition leader Pedro Passos Coelho draw up steps to 
slash the country's deficit, including public sector pay cuts. The deficit, which hit 9.4% of GDP in 2009, 
is targeted to fall to 7.3% in 2010 and 4.6% in 2011. 
May 18 Germany, in an attack on the financial speculation it blames for the debt crisis, announces a unilateral ban 
on naked short selling of shares in the country's top 10 financial institutions, on Euro government bonds 
and on related transactions in credit default swaps (CDS). 
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May 25 Italy's cabinet approves a €24 billion austerity package with the aim of cutting the deficit to 2.7% of 
GDP in 2012 from 5.3% in 2009. 
May 27 Spain wins parliamentary approval for its €15 billion ($18.4 billion) austerity package by just one vote. 
May 28 Fitch cuts Spain's credit rating by one notch to AA+ from AAA after record levels of household and 
corporate debt in Spain, as well as mounting public debt. 
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Table A3. Description of variables 
Variable Description Source 
Exposure (B) Bank's consolidated net exposure to EU sovereign debt 
relative to assets 
CEBS stress test and 
Bankscope 
GIIPS (B) Bank's consolidated net exposure to GIIPS sovereign debt 
relative to assets 
CEBS stress test and 
Bankscope 
Domestic GIIPS (B) Bank’s consolidated net exposure to domestic sovereign 
debt relative to assets if located in a GIIPS country and zero 
otherwise 
CEBS stress test and 
Bankscope 
Foreign GIIPS (B) Bank's consolidated net exposure to foreign GIIPS 
sovereign debt relative to assets 
CEBS stress test and 
Bankscope 
non-GIIPS EMU (B) Bank's consolidated net exposure to sovereign debt issued 
by non-GIIPS euro zone countries relative to assets 
CEBS stress test and 
Bankscope 
non-EMU (B) Bank's consolidated net exposure to sovereign debt issued 
by EU member states outside the euro zone relative to 
assets 
CEBS stress test and 
Bankscope 
Exposure (C) Banks' consolidated net exposure to EU sovereign debt at 
the country level relative to GDP 
CEBS stress test and 
Bankscope 
GIIPS (C) Banks' consolidated net exposure to GIIPS sovereign debt at 
the country level relative to GDP 
CEBS stress test and 
Bankscope 
Domestic GIIPS (C) Banks’ consolidated net exposure to domestic sovereign 
debt at the country level relative to GDP if located in a 
GIIPS country and zero otherwise 
CEBS stress test and 
Bankscope 
Foreign GIIPS (C) Banks’ consolidated net exposure to sovereign debt issued 
by foreign GIIPS countries at the country level relative to 
GDP 
CEBS stress test and 
Bankscope 
non-GIIPS EMU (C) Banks' consolidated net exposure to sovereign debt issued 
by non-GIIPS  euro zone countries at the country level 
relative to GDP 
CEBS stress test and 
Bankscope 
non-EMU (C) Banks' consolidated net exposure to sovereign debt issued 
by EU member states outside the euro zone at the country 
level relative to GDP 
CEBS stress test and 
Bankscope 
Excess return Five-day stock return minus bank beta times return on 
MSCI world index 
Datastream 
Bank CDS change Five-day change in the bank's 5-year CDS spread in basis 
points 
Datastream 
Sovereign CDS change Five-day change in the sovereign's 5-year CDS spread in 
basis points 
Datastream 
Government debt General government outstanding debt at the end of 2009 as 
a percentage of GDP  
Eurostat 
GIIPS location  Dummy variable that equals one if a bank is located in one 
of the GIIPS countries, and zero otherwise. 
 
GIIPS country Dummy variable that equals one if a country is a GIIPS 
country, and zero otherwise. 
 
 
30 
 
 
Table 1.  Exposure to sovereign debt issued by GIIPS, non-GIIPS and non-euro zone countries 
This table provides information on exposures to sovereign debts of banks aggregated at the level of EU member 
states in billions of euros and as a percentage of bank assets. All 63 banks are included for which exposure and 
balance sheet data are available. 
 In billions of euros As a percentage of total assets 
Country EMU   EMU   
 
GIIPS 
non-
GIIPS 
Non 
EMU Total GIIPS 
non-
GIIPS 
Non 
EMU Total 
Austria 2.8 18.5 16.0 37.3 0.79 5.14 4.44 10.37 
Belgium 37.0 51.1 20.8 108.9 3.94 5.46 2.22 11.62 
Cyprus 5.3 1.7 0.2 7.2 6.67 2.11 0.28 9.05 
Denmark 1.4 6.3 18.9 26.6 0.29 1.29 3.88 5.46 
Finland 0.1 0.9 0.1 1.0 0.09 1.10 0.12 1.31 
France 66.4 144.2 19.8 230.4 1.10 2.39 0.33 3.82 
Germany 144.2 350.1 41.5 535.9 2.60 6.32 0.75 9.67 
Greece 56.2 0.9 3.7 60.8 15.24 0.25 1.00 16.49 
Hungary 0.0 0.3 5.2 5.5 0.00 0.72 13.46 14.18 
Ireland 6.7 1.8 2.3 10.9 1.84 0.50 0.64 2.99 
Italy 129.2 34.1 13.2 176.6 6.22 1.64 0.64 8.50 
Luxemburg 3.0 2.4 0.1 5.5 8.35 6.68 0.40 15.42 
Malta 0.0 0.9 0.0 1.0 0.31 15.13 0.57 16.01 
Netherlands 16.5 66.3 9.3 92.1 0.85 3.43 0.48 4.77 
Poland 0.0 0.0 6.4 6.4 0.00 0.00 20.12 20.12 
Portugal 17.8 1.5 2.0 21.3 5.29 0.45 0.60 6.33 
Slovenia 0.3 2.3 0.0 2.6 1.50 12.15 0.04 13.69 
Spain 104.0 4.4 4.8 113.2 6.40 0.27 0.29 6.97 
Sweden 1.5 15.5 24.4 41.4 0.14 1.46 2.30 3.91 
United Kingdom 28.1 122.6 65.1 215.8 0.41 1.78 0.94 3.13 
Total 620.7 825.6 254.0 1700.3 2.19 2.92 0.90 6.01 
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Table 2. Mean tests of bank excess returns and changes in bank and sovereign CDS spreads 
 
This table provides tests of whether mean bank excess returns, bank CDS spread changes and sovereign  
CDS spread changes as calculated over one-day, three-day and five-day event windows are different from zero.  
Bank excess return is the bank stock excess stock return. Bank CDS change is the change in the 5-year bank  
CDS spread. Sovereign CDS change is the change in the 5-year sovereign CDS spread. 
 
 
 
Event window Sample mean Standard deviation t- statistic p-value 
Bank excess returns One day 0.0839 0.0059 14.15 0.000 
Three days 0.0411 0.0051 8.11 0.000 
Five days 0.0184 0.0068 2.70 0.010 
 
     
Bank CDS changes One day -44.8083 9.4514 -4.74 0.000 
Three days -40.0513 13.1564 -3.04 0.004 
Five days -31.3088 7.0050 -4.47 0.000 
 
     
Sovereign CDS changes  One day -52.8554 22.0969 -2.39 0.028 
Three days -54.4940 22.8162 -2.39 0.028 
Five days -51.4932 22.7354 -2.26 0.036 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrices  
 
This table provides descriptive statistics and correlation matrices for variables used in the bank stock excess return 
regressions (in Panel A), the bank CDS change regressions (in Panel B), and the sovereign CDS change regressions 
(in Panel C). Bank excess return is the bank stock excess return over a five-day event window. Bank CDS change is 
the change in the bank CDS spread over a five-day event window. Sovereign CDS change is the change in the 5-
year sovereign CDS spread over a five-day event window. Exposure (B), GIIPS (B), non-GIIPS EMU (B) and non-
EMU (B) are a bank's net sovereign debt exposure relative to assets to all EU countries, GIIPS countries, non-
GIIPS, EMU countries and non-EMU countries. Domestic GIIPS (B) is a bank’s consolidated net exposure to 
domestic sovereign debt relative to assets if located in a GIIPS country and zero otherwise. Foreign GIIPS (B) is a 
bank's consolidated net exposure to foreign GIIPS sovereign debt relative to assets. Government debt is general 
government debt at the end of 2009 as a percentage of GDP. GIIPS location is a dummy variable that equals one if a 
bank is located in one of the GIIPS countries and zero otherwise. GIIPS country is a dummy variable that equals one 
if a country is a GIIPS country, and zero otherwise. Exposure (C), GIIPS (C), non-GIIPS EMU (C) and non-EMU 
(C) are banks' net sovereign debt exposures to all EU countries, GIIPS countries, non-GIIPS, EMU countries and 
non-EMU countries aggregated to the country level and relative to GDP. Domestic GIIPS (C) is banks’ consolidated 
net exposure to domestic sovereign debt at the country level relative to GDP if located in a GIIPS country and zero 
otherwise. Foreign GIIPS (C) is banks' consolidated net exposure to sovereign debt issued by foreign GIIPS 
countries at the country level relative to GDP. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Sample for bank stock excess return regressions 
 
Descriptive statistics Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Excess return 48 0.02 0.05 -0.12 0.15 
Exposure (B) 48 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.35 
GIIPS (B) 48 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.34 
Domestic GIIPS (B) 48 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.34 
Foreign GIIPS (B) 48 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.07 
non-GIIPS EMU (B) 48 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.15 
non-EMU (B) 48 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.20 
Government debt 48 78.68 28.35 40.60 129.30 
GIIPS location 48 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 
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Correlation matrix 
 
Excess 
return 
Exposure 
(B) GIIPS (B) 
Domestic 
GIIPS (B) 
Foreign 
GIIPS (B) 
non-GIIPS 
EMU (B) 
non-EMU 
(B) 
Government 
debt 
GIIPS 
location 
Excess return 1         
Exposure (B) 0.318** 1        
GIIPS (B) 0.493*** 0.798*** 1       
Domestic GIIPS (B) 0.473*** 0.779*** 0.977*** 1      
Foreign GIIPS (B) 0.063 0.040 0.045 -0.169 1     
non-GIIPS EMU (B) -0.325** 0.131 -0.250* -0.285** 0.181 1    
non-EMU (B) -0.097 0.252* -0.230 -0.193 -0.157 -0.065 1   
Government debt 0.21 0.521*** 0.646*** 0.662*** -0.114 -0.123 -0.170 1  
GIIPS location 0.452*** 0.283* 0.591*** 0.626*** -0.199 -0.419*** -0.281* 0.651*** 1 
34 
 
Panel B. Sample for bank CDS spread change regressions 
Descriptive statistics Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Bank CDS 44 -31.31 46.47 -166.06 11.77 
Exposure (B) 44 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.19 
GIIPS (B) 44 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.18 
Domestic GIIPS (B) 44 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.18 
Foreign GIIPS (B) 44 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 
non-GIIPS EMU (B) 44 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.14 
non-EMU (B) 44 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06 
GIIPS location 44 0.36 0.49 0.00 1.00 
 
 
Correlation matrix 
 
Bank 
CDS 
 
Exposure 
(B) 
 
GIIPS (B) 
 
Domestic 
GIIPS (B) 
Foreign 
GIIPS (B) 
non-
GIIPS 
EMU (B) 
non-EMU 
(B) 
 
GIIPS 
location 
Bank CDS 1        
Exposure (B) -0.215 1       
GIIPS (B) -0.593*** 0.627*** 1      
Domestic GIIPS (B) -0.605*** 0.529*** 0.968*** 1     
Foreign GIIPS (B) 0.056 0.382** 0.112 -0.139 1    
non-GIIPS EMU (B) 0.429*** 0.451*** -0.359** -0.445*** 0.348** 1   
non-EMU (B) 0.084 0.162 -0.199 -0.202 0.016 0.078 1  
GIIPS location -0.660*** 0.220 0.741*** 0.782*** -0.173 -0.548*** -0.237 1 
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Panel C. Sample for sovereign CDS spread change regressions  
 
Descriptive statistics Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Sovereign CDS change 19 -51.49 99.10 -387.43 0.03 
Exposure (C) 19 0.16 0.10 0.01 0.43 
GIIPS (C) 19 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.31 
Domestic GIIPS (C) 19 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.24 
Foreign GIIPS (C) 19 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.31 
non-GIIPS EMU (C) 19 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.16 
non-EMU (C) 19 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.12 
GIIPS country 19 0.26 0.45 0.00 1.00 
 
 
Correlation matrix 
Sovereign 
CDS 
change 
Exposure 
(C) 
GIIPS 
(C) 
 
Domestic 
GIIPS 
(C) 
Foreign 
GIIPS 
(C) 
non-
GIIPS 
EMU 
(C) 
non-
EMU 
(C) 
GIIPS 
country 
Sovereign CDS change 1 
! !   ! ! !
Exposure (C) -0.125 1  ! ! ! ! !GIIPS (C) -0.520** 0.765*** 1   ! ! !
Domestic GIIPS (C) -0.927*** 0.136 0.560** 1     
Foreign GIIPS (C) 0.174 0.791*** 0.708*** -0.189 1    
non-GIIPS EMU (C) 0.439* 0.575** 0.012 -0.448* 0.395* 1 
! !
non-EMU (C) 0.22 0.1 -0.274 -0.277 -0.088 0.023 1 
!
GIIPS country -0.741*** -0.053 0.411* 0.816*** -0.209 -0.516** -0.355 1 
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Table 4. Determinants of bank excess returns 
The dependent variable is the bank stock excess return over a five-day event window. Exposure (B), GIIPS (B), non-GIIPS EMU (B) and non-EMU (B) are a 
bank's net sovereign debt exposure relative to assets to all EU countries, GIIPS countries, non-GIIPS, EMU countries and non-EMU countries. Domestic GIIPS 
(B) is a bank’s consolidated net exposure to domestic sovereign debt relative to assets if located in a GIIPS country and zero otherwise. Foreign GIIPS (B) is a 
bank's consolidated net exposure to foreign GIIPS sovereign debt relative to assets. Government debt is general government debt at the end of 2009 as a 
percentage of GDP in the country where the bank is headquartered. GIIPS location is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank is located in one of the GIIPS 
countries and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses, with the exception that standard errors are bootstrapped in 
columns 5-6. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 Baseline regressions Bootstrapped standard errors MSCI Europe 
Domestic stock 
market benchmark 
Banking book 
exposures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Exposure (B) 0.135    0.135  0.152*  0.071  0.149  
 (0.100)    (0.144)  (0.092)  (0.117)  (0.097)  
GIIPS location 0.039** 0.018 0.036** 0.023 0.039** 0.036* 0.034** 0.033** 0.016 0.019 0.039** 0.039** 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
GIIPS (B)  0.225*** 0.316***   0.316**  0.330***  0.262***  0.325*** 
  (0.069) (0.067)   (0.153)  (0.062)  (0.089)  (0.064) 
Domestic GIIPS (B)    0.205**         
    (0.073)         
Foreign GIIPS (B)    0.601         
    (0.378)         
non-GIIPS EMU (B)  -0.246 -0.137 -0.262  -0.137  -0.052  -0.051  -0.12 
  (0.260) (0.250) (0.260)  (0.343)  (0.236)  (0.215)  (0.237) 
non-EMU (B)  0.032 0.069 0.067  0.069  0.063  -0.037  0.099 
  (0.132) (0.121) (0.147)  (0.345)  (0.112)  (0.099)  (0.126) 
Government debt   -0.001*   -0.001  -0.001**  -0.001**  -0.001** 
   (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant -0.007 0.006 0.039 0.001 -0.007 0.039 -0.017 0.028 -0.011 0.039 -0.007 0.037 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.026) (0.015) (0.013) (0.034) (0.010) (0.025) (0.010) (0.027) (0.010) (0.024) 
R2 0.243 0.305 0.358 0.321 0.243 0.358 0.235 0.346 0.066 0.229 0.249 0.361 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
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Table 5. Determinants of bank CDS spread changes 
The dependent variable is the change in the bank CDS spread over a five-day event window. Exposure (B), GIIPS (B), non-GIIPS EMU (B) and non-EMU (B) 
are a bank's net sovereign debt exposure relative to assets to all EU countries, GIIPS countries, non-GIIPS, EMU countries and non-EMU countries. Domestic 
GIIPS (B) is a bank’s consolidated net exposure to domestic sovereign debt relative to assets if located in a GIIPS country and zero otherwise. Foreign GIIPS (B) 
is a bank's consolidated net exposure to foreign GIIPS sovereign debt relative to assets. GIIPS location is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank is located in 
one of the GIIPS countries, and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and provided in parentheses, with the exception that 
standard errors are bootstrapped in columns 5-6. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
 Baseline regressions Bootstrapped standard error 
Subordinated debt CDS 
spreads Bank book exposures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Exposure (B) -74.883    -74.883  -227.278  -132.816  
 (133.704)    (140.704)  (218.241)  (169.899)  
GIIPS location -61.527** -41.886   -61.527** -41.886 -72.957* -39.563 -60.785** -38.499 
 (26.865) (34.852)   (27.115) (35.728) (38.459) (32.873) (26.235) (36.168) 
GIIPS (B) 
 -261.485 -545.399***   -261.485  -571.581*  -374.068 
 
 (198.495) (114.653)   (220.093)  (342.567)  (274.163) 
Domestic 
GIIPS (B)    -555.3702***       
 
   (137.667)       
Foreign GIIPS 
(B)    -413.6135       
 
   (407.370)       
non-GIIPS 
EMU (B)  140.843** 328.663* 308.873  140.843  165.646  158.056** 
 
 (60.258) (175.586) (174.575)  (232.926)  (212.191)  (68.099) 
non-EMU (B) 
 -268.448 -128.551 -132.8626  -268.448  130.175  -425.117 
 
 (287.490) (285.782) (289.437)  (61.523)  (371.005)  (414.630) 
Constant -3.373 -8.507 -21.012 -21.27993 -3.373 -8.507 -10.38 -25.101*** -0.721 -6.765 
 (9.001) (7.290) (14.345) (14.896) (9.283) (8.263) (12.905) (7.883) (9.579) (7.421) 
R2 0.441 0.474 0.406 0.407 0.441 0.474 0.317 0.35 0.451 0.503 
N 44 44 44 44 44 44 35 35 44 44 
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Table 6. Determinants of sovereign CDS spread changes 
The dependent variable is the change in the 5-year sovereign CDS spread over a five-day event window. Exposure (C), GIIPS (C), non-GIIPS EMU (C) and non-
EMU (C) are banks' net sovereign debt exposures to all EU countries, GIIPS countries, non-GIIPS, EMU countries and non-EMU countries aggregated to the 
country level and relative to GDP. Domestic GIIPS (C) is banks’ consolidated net exposure to domestic sovereign debt at the country level relative to GDP if 
located in a GIIPS country and zero otherwise. Foreign GIIPS (C) is banks' consolidated net exposure to sovereign debt issued by foreign GIIPS countries at the 
country level relative to GDP. GIIPS country is a dummy variable that equals one if a country is a GIIPS country, and zero otherwise. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Standard errors in columns 5-7 are bootstrapped. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 Baseline regressions Bootstrapped standard errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Exposure (C) -159.882    -159.882   
 (157.966)    (199.429)   
GIIPS country -164.283*** -121.558**  11.186 -164.283*** -121.558  
 (35.684) (50.289)  (42.382) (58.935) (85.878)  
GIIPS (C)  -357.482* -579.638***   -357.482 -579.638 
 
 (214.784) (223.276)   (565.866) (487.384) 
Domestic GIIPS (C)    -1532.306***    
    (283.459)    
Foreign GIIPS (C)    -21.963    
    (152.906)    
non-GIIPS EMU (C)  274.611 770.596** 72.522  274.611 770.596** 
  (349.897) (325.972) (224.626)  (261.440) (360.699) 
non-EMU (C)  -199.822 217.583 -93.314  -199.822 217.583 
  (542.975) (592.081) (342.924)  (334.059) (451.565) 
Constant 16.533 -7.201 -67.630* -10.007 16.533 -7.201 -67.630* 
 (30.965) (40.595) (36.787) (25.590) (29.673) (17.844) (37.367) 
R2 0.577 0.628 0.473 0.863 0.577 0.628 0.473 
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 
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Table 7. Determinants of excess returns and bank and sovereign CDS spread changes around the 
announcement of the enlargement of the EFSF 
 
In columns 1-3 the dependent variable is the bank stock excess return over a five-day event window centered on 24 
June 2011. In columns 4-5 the dependent variable is the change in the bank CDS spread, while in columns 6-7 the 
dependent variable is the change in the 5-year sovereign CDS spread over the same five-day event window. 
Exposure (B), GIIPS (B), non-GIIPS EMU (B) and non-EMU (B) are a bank's net sovereign debt exposure relative 
to assets to all EU countries, GIIPS countries, non-GIIPS, EMU countries and non-EMU countries. Government 
debt is general government debt at the end of 2009 as a percentage of GDP in the country where the bank is 
headquartered. Exposure (C), GIIPS (C), non-GIIPS EMU (C) and non-EMU (C) are banks' net sovereign debt 
exposures to all EU countries, GIIPS countries, non-GIIPS, EMU countries and non-EMU countries aggregated to 
the country level and relative to GDP. GIIPS location is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank is located in one 
of the GIIPS countries, and zero otherwise. GIIPS country is a dummy variable that equals one if a country is a 
GIIPS country, and zero otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses. In regressions 1-5 robust standard errors 
clustered at the country level are estimated. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 Bank stock excess returns Bank CDS changes Sovereign CDS changes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Exposure (B)  0.094   8.331    
 (0.090)   (43.421)    
GIIPS location -0.031*** -0.000 0.001 36.468*** 33.750   
 (0.012) (0.023) (0.025) (11.800) (20.590)   
GIIPS (B)   -0.320 -0.306  43.640   
 
 (0.401) (0.416)  (224.313)   
non-GIIPS EMU (B)   0.204* 0.213  0.769   
  (0.114) (0.131)  (44.199)   
non-EMU (B)   0.170 0.170  0.076   
  (0.111) (0.116)  (433.667)   
Exposure (C)      46.126  
      (38.615)  
GIIPS country      35.137*** 23.776* 
      (9.391) (12.611) 
GIIPS (C)       100.079* 
 
      (57.325) 
non-GIIPS EMU (C)       -18.966 
       (71.881) 
non-EMU (C)       -27.383 
       (119.605) 
Government debt   -0.000     
   (0.000)     
Constant -0.048*** -0.050*** -0.046** 10.358*** 10.588*** 1.934 8.133 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.022) (3.596) (3.185) (7.253) (8.617) 
R2 0.182 0.251 0.253 0.503 0.504 0.490 0.551 
N 39 39 39 38 38 19 19 
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Table 8.  Estimated changes in valuation of bank sovereign debt holdings, shares and liabilities 
following initial EFSF announcement 
This table provides estimates of change in the values of sovereign exposures, bank liabilities and bank shares related 
to changes in values of GIIPS debts (in Panel A) and to changes in values of all EU sovereign debts (in Panel B). 
Figures are calculated for 35 banks that we have both CDS and stock market data for and are aggregated to the 
country level. Figures are based on market movements in the five-day event window. 
Column 1 of Panel A shows the change in the market value of banks’ GIIPS government bonds based on actual CDS 
spread changes. Column 2 shows the predicted change in the market value of banks’ liabilities due to GIIPS 
sovereign debt exposure based on regression 2 in Table 5. Column 3 is the same as column 2 except that now 
regression 3 in Table 5 is used. Column 4 contains the predicted change in banks’ stock market value due to GIIPS 
sovereign debt exposure based on regression 2 in Table 4. 
Column 1 of Panel B shows the change in the market value of banks’ European government bonds, based on actual 
CDS spread changes. Column 2 of the same panel shows the change in the market value of banks’ liabilities based 
on actual bank CDS spread changes. Column 3 shows the change in banks’ stock market value based on actual stock 
market movements. Total assets of banks in sample is the sum of total assets of the 35 banks in the sample.  
 
Panel A. Valuation changes on account of banks’ holdings of GIIPS debt in millions of euros 
 
Country 
GIIPS 
sovereign debt 
held by banks 
Bank 
liabilities – 
low estimate 
Bank 
liabilities – 
high estimate 
Bank stock 
market value  (2) + (4) (3) + (4) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Austria 95 24 51 34 59 85 
Belgium 961 1,009 2,113 169 1,178 2,282 
Denmark 23 44 91 8 52 100 
France 1,620 1,332 2,781 282 1,614 3,063 
Germany 749 633 1,323 75 709 1,398 
Netherlands 389 190 397 50 240 446 
Sweden 48 39 81 18 57 99 
United Kingdom 809 502 1,047 220 721 1,266 
       Greece 2,664 312 658 412 724 1,070 
Ireland 113 101 212 8 109 220 
Italy 2,162 3,630 7,627 1,098 4,728 8,725 
Portugal 517 229 482 82 311 564 
Spain 2,579 2,130 4,468 1,455 3,584 5,922 
       Total non-GIIPS 4,694 3,773 7,882 857 4,630 8,739 
Total GIIPS 8,036 6,403 13,447 3,054 9,457 16,501 
       Total 12,729 10,176 21,329 3,911 14,087 25,240 
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 Panel B. Valuation changes on account of banks’ holdings of all EU sovereign debt 
 
Country 
Total EU sovereign 
debt held by banks 
(million EUR) 
Bank liabilities 
(million EUR) 
Bank stock market 
value 
(million EUR) 
(2) + (3) 
(million EUR) 
Total bank assets 
(billion EUR) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Austria 203 232 867 1,099 360 
Belgium 1,224 716 -1,739 -1,023 937 
Denmark 74 222 -303 -82 435 
France 2,012 12,678 4,218 16,896 4,954 
Germany 966 3,408 292 3,701 2,795 
Netherlands 503 -944 1,255 312 1,188 
Sweden 121 764 -621 143 1,061 
United Kingdom 1,202 985 -4,294 -3,309 6,901 
      Greece 2,689 1,329 612 1,941 323 
Ireland 126 629 8 637 180 
Italy 2,293 1,772 1,828 3,601 2,076 
Portugal 528 2,081 553 2,634 219 
Spain 2,601 8,917 7,017 15,934 1,625 
      Total non-GIIPS 6,306 18,062 -325 17,736 18,630 
Total GIIPS 8,237 14,728 10,019 24,747 4,423 
      Total 14,544 32,790 9,693 42,483 23,053 
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Figure 1. Mean cumulative excess returns and 5-year bank and sovereign CDS spreads by region 
from 30 days before to 30 days after the event date 
Bank stock cumulative excess returns are weighted by total assets in 2009. Bank CDS spreads are weighted by total 
assets in 2009. Sovereign CDS spreads are weighted by general government debts at the end of 2009. 
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Figure 2. Mean bank stock cumulative excess returns, bank CDS spreads, and sovereign 
CDS spreads by country from 30 days before to 30 days after the event date 
Bank stock cumulative excess returns are weighted by total assets in 2009. Bank CDS spreads are weighted by total 
assets in 2009. 
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